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Dramatic improvements have been made in the State of Georgia’s overall economic
development program during the 1990s.  When judged against extant empirical evidence, as well as
economic logic, the current program has many laudable features (The Governor’s Development
Council, 1997; Ihlanfeldt, 1995).  Nevertheless, it also possesses some important weaknesses which
may hinder the achievement of he state’s economic development objectives and its ability to compete
with other states.  These weaknesses fall into five categories: (1) a misplaced emphasis on capital as
opposed to labor cost subsidies;  (2) poor targeting of the state’s economic development incentives;
(3) the absence of state monitoring of property tax abatements at the local evel;  (4) the use of a jobs
tax credit having little value to businesses, and; (5) the failure to properly evaluate the state’s
economic development programs.  The purpose is to highlight these weaknesses and recommend
policies to overcome them with an eye toward bringing further improvement to the state’s economic
development program.
Capital vs. Labor Cost Subsidies
Both capital and labor cost subsidies have a place in the state’s overall economic development
program, but there is an issue whether the existing subsidies are properly placed. Capital cost
subsidies are known to attract new investment and capital-intensive industries (Bosworth and
Burtless, 1992; Auerbach and Hassett, 1992). Empirical evidence suggests that capital-intensive
investment is most compatible with jobs for skilled workers, and that capital generally substitutes for
low-skilled workers. 
Labor cost subsidies of the type emphasized in Georgia (i.e., tax credits based upon the
number of jobs created rather than a subsidy in the form of a percentage of the wage bill) reduces the
vcost of lower-paid workers compared to higher-paid workers and encourages the substitution of
lower skilled for more highly skilled, better-paid workers.
Due to their differing effects, capital and labor cost subsidies should be targeted as follows:
(1) where there is a ready supply of skilled workers or where app opriate raining could bring forth
such a supply within a reasonable time period, capital cost subsidies should be used, and  (2) where
jobs are needed for lower-skilled workers, labor cost subsidies are the preferred alternative.  
These targeting rules are only partially followed within Georgia’s overall economic
development programs. Two examples are illustrative. First, the incentive contained in the state’s new
enterprise zone legislation is the abatement of property taxes, which is a capital cost subsidy. But the
primary need within the distressed areas that are eligible for zone designation is jobs for lower-skilled
workers. This argues for the use of a labor cost subsidy.  Second, firms locating or expanding
employment i  Georgia can take either a job tax credit or an investment tax credit, but not both.  The
amounts of the credits are larger and eligibility criteria are weaker in the state’s least developed
counties, which is desirable.  But the relative attractiveness and availability of investment versus job
tax credits might also be made to vary across counties, with the latter emphasized in Tier One (least
developed) counties.
More Precise Targeting
There are a number of facts relevant to state and local economic development that should be
kept in the forefront in deciding which businesses are eligible for taxincentives and other financial
subsidies:
• On average, about hree-quarters of the jobs created by economic growth go to in-
migrants from other states and countries (Bartik, 1991).
• Economic development incentives are costly per job created. Bartik (1994) has
estimated that the average net government cost per job created by incentives is
equivalent to around $4,000 annually.
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• Economic research shows that there are marked ifferences in the quality of jobs
across different industries as well as within given industries for workers with similar
education, age, and other characteristics.  
• Different industries have widely different employment and multiplier effects.
To maximize the benefits of incentives relative to their costs, it is imperative that the state
more finely target its incentives.  Some targeting is already done. However, in recent years many
other states have fine-tuned the targeting of their economic development i centives in recognition of
their high costs; Georgia should follow their lead.
Property Tax Abatements at the Local Level
There is no statewide property tax abatement program in Georgia.  However, local
governments in Georgia frequently employ property tax reductions and abatements to attract
employers to their communities.  But there are major concerns with these incentives.  First, local
communities within the state are pitted against one another, which enhances the bargaining power of
firms’ relative to that of the communities. Second, communities are highly unequal in their ability to
offer property tax incentives. Third, there is a common perception, which may or may not be
accurate, that some communities are playing unfairly by offering abatements without he legal
authority to do so. Finally, there is the concern that some communities are trading better schools and
other public services for jobs, which may jeopardize the long-run competitive position of the
community and state.
Unfortunately, no information is collected by the state or other entity from local communities
on the use of property tax abatements. Georgia should follow the lead of the State of Tennessee and
pass a disclosure law that would provide the data necessary for possible statewide reform.
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The Job Tax Credit: A Critique
Georgia’s principal labor cost subsidy is the jobs tax credit (JTC).  Recent evidence suggests that the
JTC has little, if any, effect on job expansion or job location within the state. Faulk (1998) found that:
• Over the years 1993-1995 only 0.01 percent of all taxable firms in the state took the
JTC.
• The participation rate among eligible firms (i.e., those that had created the minimum
number of jobs and sustained them over the required two year time period) during
1993-1995 was only 19 percent.
• On average, among the firms that took the JTC, the savings in labor costs was less
than 1 percent.
The first two facts indicate that the JTC program is highly underutilized.  There are two
possible reasons for this: firms are unaware of the program and/or the net benefits (benefits less costs)
from program participation are negligible. 
If a labor cost subsidy is to succeed in creating jobs, at a minimum it must be valuable to
businesses.  A labor cost subsidy more valuable than the current JTC could be constructed in one of
two ways: (1) allow the JTC to be taken against other tax liabilities of the business and not just its
corporate income tax liability or (2) provide a subsidy per job created rather than a tax expenditure.
Evaluation of Economic Development Programs
Like most other states, Georgia does little to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of its tax
incentives and other economic development programs.  One approach to evaluation that has grown
in popularity is “benchmarking”; benchmarking refer to measurable indicators of progress made
toward accomplishing long-run goals, or to both goals and outcomes.  Benchmarking was proposed
by the Governor’s Development Council (Governor’s Development Council, 1994), and while it has
been introduced as part of the state budget process, a more detailed and extensive benchmarking
effort is needed if it is to serve as a basis for evaluation.
Benchmarking has a number of attractive f atures.  First, it forces the state to envision what
it wishes to become, an essential element in any long-run plan. Second, it permits progress toward
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long-range strategic goals to be monitored.  There are also important limitations of benchmarking.
First,  benchmarking does not directly link the amount of progress to specific state programs or
policies; it is therefore limited in its ability to serve as an evaluation i strument. Second, much of the
variation in benchmarks over time can be attributed to changes in the national economy. 
In addition to benchmarking, there are two other strategies for evaluating state and local
economic development programs that are worthwhile, namely, firm surveys and hypothetical firm
techniques.
Many of Georgia’s economic development programs involve providing services to firms --
information, training, advice, etc.  These programs can be evaluated relatively inexpensively by
written surveys of the businesses that are clients of these programs, asking them to rate the quality
and effectiveness of the assistance they received. 
The hypothetical firm technique allows reliable calculations of the relative values of different
financial subsidies to firms within a particular industry.  Models are built that replicate the operation
ratios, balance sheets, and income and tax statements of real, or at least “potentially” real firms.  This
allows researches to simulate the impact on a firm’s income of a state’s, city’s, or county’s taxes and
economic development incentives.  
1ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Dramatic improvements have been made in the State of Georgia’s overall economic
development program during the 1990s.  When judged against extant empirical evidence, as well as
economic logic, the current program has many laudable features (The Governor’s Development
Council, 1997; Ihlanfeldt, 1995).  Nevertheless, it also possesses some important weaknesses, which
may hinder the achievement of he state’s economic development objectives and its ability to compete
with other states.  These weaknesses fall into five categories: (1) a misplaced emphasis on capital as
opposed to labor cost subsidies; (2) poor targeting of the state’s economic development i centives;
(3) the absence of state monitoring of property tax abatements at the local evel; (4) the use of a jobs
tax credit having little value to businesses, and; (5) the failure to properly evaluate the state’s
economic development programs.  This report highlights these weaknesses and recommends policies
to overcome them with an eye toward bringing further improvement to the state’s economic
development program.
I.  Capital vs. Labor Cost Subsidies
Georgia relies heavily on both capital and labor cost subsidies as economic development
incentives.  Examples of capital cost subsidies are: (1) investment tax credits, which were first begun
as part of the Georgia Business Expansion and Support Act of 1994; (2) property tax abatements
provided by local economic development authorities and within local and state designated nterprise
zones; (3) freeport tax exemptions that exempt certain inventories from property taxation, and; (4)
sales tax exemptions on machinery and equipment.  The state’s principal labor cost subsidy is the Job
Tax Credit (JTC), but the Retraining Tax Credit, Child Care Tax Credit, Quick Start job training
program, and the recently created Intellectual Capital Partnership Program also can be placed in this
category because they all reduce firms’ labor costs.
2Both capital and labor cost subsidies have a place in the state’s overall economic development
program, but there is an issue whether the existing subsidies are properly placed. Capital cost
subsidies are known to atract new investment and capital-intensive industries (Bosworth and
Burtless, 1992; Auerbach and Hassett, 1992).  These are desirable outcomes if the state desires
continued economic growth since capital-intensive ndustries are growing and pay high wages.  In
contrast, labor-intensive industries throughout the United States are struggling to survive against
foreign competition.  However, empirical evidence also suggests that capital-intensive investment is
most compatible with jobs for skilled workers, and that capital generally substitutes for low-skilled
workers.  Kesselman, Williamson, and Brandt (1977) studied whether capital was complementary
with white or blue-collar workers, and whether these two categories of workers were substitutes for
one another.  They found that capital is complementary with white-collar workers and a substitute
for blue-collar employees in manufacturing.  Thus a subsidy to capital will stimulate the use of capital,
raise the demand for its complement (white-collar workers), and reduce the demand for substitutes,
i.e., blue-collar workers.  More important for the issue at hand, they found that tax credits for
employment dramatically increase the number of jobs, compared to investment tax credits (for equal
revenue foregone), and that marginal employment tax credits (tax credits for new employees hired)
have the largest effect on employment.  These results are supported by more recent research by
Bergstrom and Panas (1992), Papke (1993), and Gravelle (1992).  Hence, it appears that there is now
a growing consensus on this issue among economists.
Labor cost subsidies of the type emphasized in Georgia (namely, a fixed amount of subsidy
[i.e., credit] for each worker hired) reduces the cost of lower-paid workers compared to higher-paid
workers and encourages the substitution f lower skilled for more highly skilled, better-paid workers.
Due to their differing effects, capital and labor cost subsidies should be targeted as follows:
(1) where there is aready supply of skilled workers or where appropriate raining could bring forth
3such a supply within a reasonable time period, capital cost subsidies hould be used, and (2) where
jobs are needed for lower-skilled workers, labor costsubsidie are the preferred alternative.  These
targeting rules are only partially followed within Georgia’s overall economic development programs.
For example, the incentive contained in the state’s new enterprise zone legislation (the Georgia
Enterprise Zone Employment Act, House Bill 633) is the abatement of ad valorem property taxes,
which is a type of capital cost subsidy.  But the primary need within the distressed areas that are
eligible for zone designation is jobs for lower-skilled workers.  This argues for the use of labor cost
subsidies.  When capital subsidies are used instead, there may actually occur a reduction in both
wages and employment within the zone (Gravelle, 1992; Papke, 1993).  At a minimum, economic
development policies hould do no harm, even where they are not particularly effective.  This may
not be true for enterprise zones within the State of Georgia.
Another example of imprecise targeting of capital and labor cost subsides i  that firms locating
or expanding employment i  Georgia can take either a job tax credit or an investment tax credit, but
not both.  No attempt is made to target these subsidies according to the guidelines offered above.
The amounts of the credits are larger and eligibility criteria re weaker in the state’s least developed
counties, which is desirable.  But the relative attractiveness and availability of investment versus job
tax credits might also be made to vary across counties, with the latter emphasized in Tier One (least
developed) counties.
The long-run goal should be to increase the skills of workers living in Tier One counties so
that hese areas are attractive to higher wage, capital-intensive ndustries.  But improving the quality
of a region’s workforce takes considerable time because this process must begin with better basic
education within elementary and secondary schools.  Moreover, after improving workforce quality,
it may take an extended period of time to alter the negative impressions that many potential investors
have of the skill levels of Georgia’s rural workforce. In the interim, Tier One counties badly need
4lower-skilled replacement jobs for those now being lost in Georgia’s traditional industries: pulp and
paper; textiles, carpet, and apparel; and food processing.  The emphasis, therefore, should be on job
tax credits and not investment tax credits.  Currently firms in Tier One counties can take a 5 percent
investment tax credit (total investment must be at least one million dollars) or a $2500 job tax credit
for each new job created (at least five new full-time workers must be hired).  To encourage job
expansion within Tier One counties three options can be suggested: (1) eliminate the investment tax
credit, (2) increase the amount of the job tax credit, or (3) modify the investment tax credit o include
a job creation requirement (e.g., to be eligible for the current 5 percent investment tax credit, in
addition to investing a minimum of one million dollars in plant and equipment, a minimum of, say, 30
new jobs might be required).
II.  More Precise Targeting
There are a number of facts relevant to state and local economic development that should be
kept in the forefront in deciding which businesses are eligible for tax incentives and other financial
subsidies:
(1) On average, about hree-quarters of the jobs created by economic growth go to in-migrants
from other states and countries--only one-quarter go to original state residents (Bartik,
1991).
(2) Economic development i centives are costly per job created.  Incentives are not a free lunch.
They are costly because there is a revenue loss associated with the fact that many firms would
have come to the state or expanded within the state regardless of incentives provided.  Bartik
(1994) has estimated that the average net government cost per job created by incentives is
equivalent to around $4,000 annually for the ife f the plant.  Similar high costs have been
estimated by Murray (1992).
(3) Economic research shows that there are marked differences in the qualityof jobs across
different industries as well as within given industries for workers with similar education, age,
and other characteristics.  Job quality varies not only because wages are different but also
because of differences in working conditions, fringe benefits, opportunities for advancement,
and worker training (Katz and Summers, 1989; Groshen, 1991; Osterman, 1988; Appelbaum
and Batt, 1994).
5(4) Different industries have widely different employment effects.  Industries that export more
of their products or services out-of-state or that rely more heavily on in-state suppliers have
stronger forward and backward linkages, respectively; stronger linkages result in higher
employment and income multipliers.
The above facts indicate that he costs of creating jobs via tax incentives and other financial
subsidies are high and that the benefits from new jobs vary greatly depending on who gets the jobs
(original residents versus immigrant), the quality of the jobs, and the size of multiplier effects.  To
maximize the benefits of incentives relative to their costs, it is imperative that the statemorefin ly
target i s incentives.  Some targeting is already done: job and investment tax credits are worth more
in less developed counties and both of these credits, as well as sales tax exemptions, are generally
restricted to industries hat erve markets that extend beyond state boundaries. However, the state
should also consider targeting high quality jobs (as defined above), jobs that go to original state
residents, and jobs in industries that have high multiplier effects.  As an illustration, it would be
relatively easy to amend the JTC to provide higher credits for new jobs that (1) pay above a c rtain
wage or that provide health care insurance, (2) go to original state residents, or (3) are in industries
that have strong forward or backward linkages within the state.  Larger credits might also begiven
to firms within the industries that are the foci of the Georgia Research Alliance—advanced
telecommunications, biotechnology, and environmental technologies.
In recent years, many other states have fine-tuned the targeting of their economic
development i centives in recognition of their high costs.  For example, Kentucky and Oklahoma both
provide incentives to service facilities but require that they export more than 75 percent of their
services outside the state.  Moreover, in the case of Kentucky, firms must increase their employment
of Kentucky residents by a minimum of 25 new, full-time jobs.  Oklahoma restricts its incentives to
firms that offer workers basic health benefits.  Alabama’s income tax credits and job development
credits are both restricted to relatively high-wage jobs.  Florida’s primary incentive program is the
6Qualified Target Industry Tax Refund Program.  To qualify for a refund, a business must pay an
average wage that is at least 15 percent greater than the state’s average annual wage and create
employment beyond a minimum amount.  The job creation must also make a significant contribution
to the local economy as judged by the Department of Commerce.  Other states that are more closely
targeting their incentives to maximize benefit/cost ratios include North Carolina, Arizona, and Utah.
Georgia should follow their lead.
III.  Property Tax Abatements at the Local Level
There is no statewide property tax abatement program in Georgia.  In the case of industrial
development bond financing, local communities may be able to offer companies ad valorem tax
exemption, depending upon the type of Development Authority established and its legal powers. Such
an exemption is possible if the Development Authority is a Constitutional Development Authority
governed by a local constitutional amendment containing the power to grant he exemption and if the
Development Authority is the legal owner of the property under a “sale and leaseback” arrangement.
If the Development Authority is a Constitutional Development Authority without he power to grant
the exemption, a Statutory Development Authority, or a Downtown Development Authority, and if
legal title to the property is held by the Development Authority, the property financed by industrial
development bonds is exempt from ad valorem taxation, but the leasehold estate owned by the
company is subject to property taxes.  Under this arrangement, property taxes are low r than if the
company held title to the property, since the leasehold estate is assessed at a lower rate than if the
legal title is held by the company.
Local governments in Georgia frequently employ property tax reductions and abatements to
attract employers to their communities.  But there are major concerns with these incentives.  First,
local communities within the state are pitted against one another, which enhances the bargaining
power of firms’ relative to that of the communities.  As a result, communities may end up giving away
7more in order to “land the location” than would be necessary in the absence of intrastate competition.
Second, communities are highly unequal in their ability to offer property tax incentives;  i.e., the
playing field is anything but level.  What exacerbates this concern is that the communities with the
greatest need for jobs are those least able to afford losses in property tax revenue.  Third, there is a
common perception, which may or may not be accurate, that some communities are playing unfairly
by offering abatements without the legal authority to do s . Finally, there is the concern that some
communities are trading better schools and other public services for jobs, which may jeopardize the
long-run competitive position of the community and state, as well as reduce the future opportunities
of the community’s youth.
Unfortunately, no information is collected from local communities on their use of property
tax abatements by the state or any other entity.  All that is available is anecdotal information (which
in most cases tends to underscore the above concerns).  Such information is not sufficient for the
development of sound policy.  Hence, Georgia should follow the lead of the State of Tennessee and
pass a disclosure law.  Legislation passed in Tennessee in 1992 requires that:
All economic development agreements should be reduced to writing and submitted
to the chief executive officer of each jurisdiction i  which the property is located and
to the comptroller of the treasury, for review, but not approval.  The agreement may
be submitted in advance of its execution but must be submitted within ten days after
its execution.  The name of private business entities which are parties to the
agreement may be obscured on copies of agreements submitted in advance of their
execution. [Acts 1992, ch. 1000,  §3.]
A disclosure law would reduce possible illegalities in the abatement process and would help flag those
communities whose abatement practices may be detrimental to the overall good of the community.
Most importantly, disclosure would provide the data necessary for possible statewide reform in the
future.
8IV.  The Jobs Tax Credit: A Critique
It was argued above that labor cost subsidies are the preferred incentive in areas where job
creation is the most important economic development objective.  Georgia’s principal labor costs
subsidy is the jobs tax credit (JTC), which was established by the Georgia State Legislature in 1989.
Since then, additional legislation has been passed that increased the amount of the tax credits and
extended their eligibility.  Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that the JTC has little, if any, effect
on job expansion or job location within the state.  Here are the facts (Faulk, 1998):
(1) Over the years 1993-1995 only 0.01 percent of all taxable firms in the state took the JTC.
(2) The participation rate among eligible firms (i.e., those that had created the minimum number
of jobs and sustained them over the required two year time period) during 1993-1995 was 19
percent.
(3) On average, among the firms that took the JTC, the savings in labor costs was less than 1
percent.
The first two facts indicate that the JTC program is highly underutilized.  There are two
possible reasons for this: firms are unaware of the program and/or the net benefits (benefits less costs)
from program participation are negligible.  Extant evidence lends support to both of these reasons.
The 1995 Georgia Business Climate Survey indicated that “business owners are generally not aware
of the tax incentives available through the Business Expansion Support Act of 1994” (Governor’s
Development Council, 1996).  The centerpiece of this Act was the expansion of the JTC program to
all counties throughout the state.  The possibility that net benefits may be too small to induce
widespread participation is indicated by the small labor cost savings experienced by participating firms
as the result of taking the credits.  In addition, growing firms tend to be small, start-up firms without
income tax liability.  If credits are too small to cause eligible firms to participate, they are also likely
to be too small to affect business location and expansion decisions.
There is additional evidence which suggests hat he JTCs may be irrelevant to firms’ decision
making.  A recent survey of corporate executives indicated that they used a real interest rate of 12
9percent to discount future cash flows (Summers and Poterba, 1994).  This is an important finding
because, as Bartik (1995) has noted, it indicates that he typical U.S. business firm has a short time
horizon.  Tax savings provided in future years may therefore have little effect on current corporate
decisions.  Among the firms who took the JTC over the years 1993-1995, 50 percent carried the
credits forward to future years (Faulk, 1998).  (The program allows unused JTCs to be carried
forward for up to ten years.)  The most obvious explanation for postponing the use of tax credits is
that he firm’s profits are too low to generate enough tax liability against which to take the credits.
Among the firms that are eligible for the JTC but do not bother to take it, approximately 65 percent
have little or no tax liability.  Also, among all taxable corporations in Georgia more than 75 percent
have no tax liability in any given year.  The combination of small labor cost savings and the
postponement a d therefore discounting of these savings causes Georgia’s JTC program to be of little
value to most firms.
If a labor cost subsidy is to succeed in creating jobs, at a minimum it must be valuable to
businesses.  A labor cost subsidy more valuable than the current JTC could be constructed in one of
two ways.  The easiest approach would be to simply allow the JTC to be taken against other tax
liabilities of the business and not just its corporate income tax liability.  For example, Florida offers
a $5000 JTC that can be taken against the corporate income tax, sales and use taxes, intangible
personal property taxes, emergency excise taxes, and ad valorem taxes.  By increasing the number
of taxes eligible for credits, those firms with low corporate income tax liability would still be able to
benefit from the JTCs without being forced to carry the credits forward thereby discounting their
value.
The other approach to a more valuable labor cost subsidy would be to provide some type of
subsidy per job created rather than a tax expenditure.  Again, the easiest way to do this would be to
amend the existing JTC to allow for refundable credits, as is done in a number of other states.
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Another attractive job creation subsidy is the forgiveable oan, which over time is converted to a grant
if job creation goals are met.  The advantages of forgiveable loans are as follows:
• As is true with increasing the number of tax liabilities against which the JTC can be
taken, forgiveable oans account for the fact that businesses have short ime horizons.
• Forgiveable oans have a built-in “clawback” provision that allows for a rec very of
the subsidy if the firm fails to deliver the requisite number of jobs.
• Forgiveable oans force current leaders to deal with the costs of subsidies during their
time in office.  Tax expenditures carried over up to 10 years into the future
encourages irresponsible public decision making.
• Despite their advantages, forgiveable loans have not been widely implemented by
other states.  In contrast, JTCs are offered by most states.  Because of their greater
value to businesses, forgiveable loans could enhance the competitive position of
Georgia relative to other states.
V.  Evaluation of Economic Development Programs
Like most other states, Georgia does little to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of its tax
incentives and other economic development programs.  One approach to evaluation that has grown
in popularity is “benchmarking”; benchmarking refer to measurable indicators of progress made
toward accomplishing long-run goals, or to both goals and outcomes.  Regardless of precise
definition, the major difference between benchmarks and traditional ssessment tools used by states
is that benchmarking focuses on results and outcomes rather than activities such as dollars spent or
services provided.  Oregon, in 1991, was the first state to use the benchmarking method of
performance evaluation; since then, the device has spread to many other state and local governments.
In Georgia, benchmarking was proposed by the Governor’s Development Council (Governor’s
Development Council, 1994), and while it has been introduced as part of the state budget process,
a more detailed and extensive benchmarking effort is needed if it is to serve as a basis for evaluation.
Benchmarking has a number of attractive f atures.  First, it forces the state to envision what
it wishes to become, an essential element in any long-run plan. Second, it permits progress toward
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long-range strategic goals to be monitored.  There are also important limitations of benchmarking.
First, the relationship between milestones and goals is often unclear.  Second, benchmarking does not
directly link the amount of progress to specific state programs or policies; it is therefore limited in its
ability to serve as an evaluation i strument. Third, much of the variation i  benchmarks over time can
be attributed to changes in the national economy.  For example, one of the most commonly employed
benchmarks is per capita income.  In his 1993 study State Government and Economic Performance,
Paul Brace found that holding all other factors constant, 90 percent of the variation over time ina
state’s per capita income can be explained by changes in the national business cycle. As Weinstein
(1995) has noted “The implication of Brace’s work, of course, is that at most 10 percent of the
variation is state economic performance will be influenced by sub-national policy interventions.”
Thus, benchmarking efforts can be substantially improved if chosen benchmarks are computed relative
to the national average of such benchmarks.  In this way, a state’s progress can be measured relative
to that of other states; and, more importantly, the results of its economic development programs can
be better assessed.  As an example, consider how successful Georgia has been in moving its citizens
from welfare to work.  But the real question is how much of this success can be attributed to
enlightened state policy and how much is due to the continuing strength of the national economy?
If the state was to adopt a relative benchmarking evaluation program, this question as well as others
related to the effectiveness of state policies, could be better addressed.
In addition to benchmarking, there are two other strategies for evaluating state and local
economic development programs that are worthwhile, namely, firm surveys and hypothetical firm
techniques.
Many of Georgia’s economic development programs involve providing services to firms--
information, training, advice, etc.  These programs can be evaluated relatively inexpensively by
written surveys of the businesses that are clients of these programs, asking them to rate the quality
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and effectiveness of the assistance they received.  Surveys can also be done for programs that provide
tax subsidies, loans, or other financial subsidies to firms.  Many economists, however, are doubtful
that he latter surveys will yield reliable information because there is incentive for “strategic behavior”
on the part of respondents who believe their answers may influence the study’s results -- and thereby,
public policy toward business.  For this reason, these economists believe responses will be biased in
favor of financial subsidies.  While this may be true, Ihlanfeldt (1995) cites evidence that suggests
strategic behavior may not be so common as to completely invalidate the usefulness of the survey
approach.  Because firms do not have strong incentives to engage in strategic behavior in responding
to questions that ask about the services provided to them by the stat , surveys hould definitely be
employed to evaluate these programs.  They might also be used in the case of financial subsidies, but
only with the appropriate caveats regarding the possibility of biased responses.
To maximize the usefulness of the survey approach to program evaluation, the survey
instrument should be standardized across programs and over time.  In that way, the relative
effectiveness of different programs and changes in their effectiveness can be more accurately judged.
In addition, surveys hould be conducted by independent third parties (i.e., not by the agency that
administers the program), and there should be complete client confidentiality.  The details on how to
conduct surveys of the business clients of state conomic development programs, including suggested
survey instruments, can be found in Monitoring the Outcomes of Economic Development Programs
by Harry Hatry, et al. (1990).
While Georgia has not routinely used the survey approach to evaluate its economic
development programs, the state does have some experience that could b  dr wn upon to develop
a comprehensive economic development client survey program.  For example, in 1997 a large-scale
survey of the Department of Technical and Adult Education’s (DTAE) clients was jointly conducted
by the Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia and the Georgia Fiscal
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Research Program at Georgia State University.  The state’s return on its investment in this project
could be maximized by applying the knowledge acquired in conducting the DTAE surveys to similar
surveys of the state’s other economic development programs.
Because of possible response bias from strategic behavior when conducting surveys to
evaluate financial subsidy programs, there is a need for an alternative evaluation echnique of these
programs.  Fortunately, the hypothetical firm technique can meet his need.  As discussed above, if
incentives are not valuable to a firm they are unlikely to affect where the firm locates or whether it
expands.  The hypothetical firm technique allows reliable calculations of the relative values of
different financial subsidies to firms within a particular industry.  Models are built that replicate the
operation ratios, balance sheets, and income and tax statements of real, or at least “potentially” real
firms.  This allows researches to simulate the impact on a firm’s income of a state’s, city’s, or
county’s taxes and economic development incentives.  If the State of Georgia was to develop
hypothetical firm models for the industries it was interested in attracting (e.g., those listed earlier that
are part of the Georgia Research Alliance), there ould be handsome paybacks in the evaluation of
existing incentives and the development of new ones.  The results of these models could also be used
in marketing efforts by demonstrating to prospective employers the “bottom-line” advantage of a
Georgia location.  For more detail on the hypothetical firm technique, see Fisher and Peters (1998).
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